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Estudos recentes relatam diferenças na performance de empresas com base no 
status do respetivo CEO. Este estudo examina empiricamente o desempenho das 
empresas cujo CEO é fundador. Utilizo uma amostra de 96 empresas americanas 
públicas cujo CEO é fundador ou cofundador para estimar os coeficientes das 
variáveis explicativas de Fama e French (1992) SMB, HML, WML, RMW e CMA 
usando o estimador de mínimos quadrados. Os resultados obtidos são 
emocionantes e esclarecedores. Ambas os portfólios produzem resultados 
robustos e com significância estatística global. Os portfólios value-weighted e 
eqaual-weighted obtêm retornos que variam de 1.51% a 2.01%. Isto sugere que 
existe um nexo de causalidade entre a existência de retornos anormais positivos 
e a performance de empresas cujo CEO é fundador e é de grande importância 
para os profissionais que trabalham no setor financeiro. 
 





Research has been conducted that finds differences in firm performance 
according to the CEO status. This dissertation empirically examines founder-
CEO firm’s performance. I use a sample of 96 listed US companies that are either 
founder or co-founder run to regress Fama and French’s (1992) independent 
variables SMB, HML, WML, RMW and CMA on equal-weighted and value-
weighted excess returns using the OLS regression model. The results obtained 
are exciting and clarifying. Both portfolios produce very robust results and global 
statistical significance throughout. I find that the value-weighted and equal-
weighted portfolios earn abnormal monthly returns ranging from 1.51% to 
2.01%. This finding suggests there is a causal link between the existence of 
positive abnormal returns and founder-CEO firms and is of high importance for 
practitioners working in the finance industry. 
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Founder-CEO firms represent eleven percent of the U.S. listed companies. In 
this dissertation I set out to test the quantitative nature of the relationship 
between founder-CEOs and firm performance. I will look for abnormal returns 
based on the theory that founder-CEO firms are more profitable than firms that 
are not led by their founder or co-founder. The rationale lies on one major 
assumption: that the founder that holds the position of CEO is also a shareholder. 
By accumulating both positions they solve the principal-agent problem, i.e., the 
conflict of priorities and personal interests between shareholders and CEOs, by 
eliminating agency costs arising from the separation of ownership and control. 
This means that the personal interests of the CEO are perfectly aligned with those 
of shareholders. Thus, when the CEO adopts policies and behaviours that will 
benefit the companies’ value, he is doing so to himself in a case of “profitable 
selfishness” (Maury, 2006). 
There is research yet to be done regarding founder-led companies, especially 
when considering its relevance. In the first place, and even though this is an 
academic study the consequences of these results are by no means confined to 
this sphere. They are particularly important to practitioners and those that are in 
some way involved in the stock market, e.g., professionals in the investment 
banking sector because it identifies a particular characteristic of a firm that has 
the potential to make it more valuable – and that is what it all comes down to. 
Moreover, this topic has never been as relevant as now. Simply because it could 
not have been studied before since the average firm age at IPO was too high and 
that meant the CEO was no longer the founder. With a drastic decrease in firm 
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age at IPO and a fast-pacing economy founder-CEO firms are undoubtedly a 
matter of great interest1. 
Unlike various studies, e.g., Maury (2006), Barontini and Caprio (2006) and 
Barontini and Bozzi (2012), that have an approach based on Tobin’s Q and ROA, 
I will look for positive abnormal returns using the OLS estimator to estimate 
equal-weighted and value-weighted portfolios of the three (Fama & French, 
1992), four (Carhart, 1997a) and five-factor models (Fama & French, 2015). Using 
a sample composed of monthly returns of 96 founder-led firms that constitute 
the present holding of the Global X Founder-Run Companies ETF, I constructed 
an equal-weighted and value-weighted portfolio and obtained fascinating results 
that provide suggestive evidence that these firms do generate abnormal returns 
in excess of 1.5%.  
This dissertation is structured as follows: Chapter 1 provides a synthetic 
review of meaningful literature; Chapter 2 presents the theoretical hypothesis 
and econometric model used; in Chapter 3 I describe the sample data; in Chapter 
4 I present the results attained and discuss their implications and, lastly, Chapter 
5 draws conclusions.  
 
1 Sheetz, M. (2017, August 24). Technology killing off corporate America: Average life span of companies under 









1. Portfolio Theory 
Portfolio theory concerning choice and performance has been for a long time 
a fundamental area in finance to which many have contributed. However this 
was not the case when Harry Markowitz (Markowitz, 1952) first put forward his 
findings. In 1952 Markowitz published his portfolio optimization model that 
relied on various investment behaviour assumptions such as the rationality of 
investors, their risk aversion, among others. The idea behind the model is a 
mathematical framework in which a portfolio’s expected return is maximized for 
a given level of risk. Such result is attained through the inclusion of different 
types of financial assets with different risk-return profiles in said portfolio, i.e., 
diversification. 
2. Traditional Measures of Portfolio Performance 
Classical performance measures are simple and easily understandable since 
they consist in comparing the excess returns obtained by the portfolios to some 
measure of risk. In the following subsections I will analyse the three most 
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important risk-adjusted performance measures: The Sharpe Ratio, The Treynor 
Ratio and Jensen’s Alpha. 
2.1 The Sharpe Ratio 
Initially called the reward-to-variability ratio (Sharpe, 1966), the Sharpe Ratio 
is perhaps the simplest of measures. It provides a mensuration of the excess 
return of a portfolio compared to its standard deviation or total risk. In other 
words, it is designed to measure the portfolio’s ability to yield a return per unit 
of total risk. However, because it uses total risk the Sharpe Ratio is not fit to assess 
a particular security in an investor’s portfolio but instead the portfolio as a whole 
since it ignores the correlation between that particular security and the remainder 
securities. Thus, applying this measure in the above-mentioned conditions will 
lead to misleading results that have no meaningful interpretation and will not 
represent the risk exposure of the investor’s total position. 
 
2.2 The Treynor Ratio 
 
The Treynor Ratio is a measure comparable to the Sharpe Ratio in the sense 
that it also compares the portfolio’s return in excess of the return on a riskless 
asset to a measure of risk. However, it compares said return to the systematic risk 
or portfolio beta and not total risk. This important difference makes it 
particularly appropriate to appreciate the performance of diversified portfolios 
considering that all the risk that is left is systematic risk. It is also for this reason 
that it can be used to assess the performance of an individual portfolio within the 
investor’s assets. There is, however, a drawback in this measure. In order to 
compute the ratio, we will have to choose an efficient market index. According 
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to Richard Roll (1977) there is an impossibility to observe or recreate a portfolio 
so diversified that it could contain all the assets in the market which undoubtedly 
will limit its uses. 
 
2.3 Jensen’s Alpha 
 
The measures I have thus far described do not do any work explaining a 
manager's success in adding value to its investors nor provide any insights into 
the value he creates or destroys. Jensen's Alpha (Jensen, 1968) addresses this 
issue. Conceivably, it is the most popular measure of portfolio performance and 
the most controversial as well (Aragon & Ferson, 2006). Notwithstanding, 
Jensen's Alpha is broadly used in academic empirical studies (Grinblatt & 
Titman, 1989). The model derives from the capital asset pricing model of Sharpe 
and Lintner that I will explain in detail in the following subsection. The reason 
that led Michael Jensen to create this measure was mainly the necessity for a 
measure of performance that was not a relative measure of performance but 
instead an absolute one. It is important, however, to clarify that performance 
refers strictly to the manager's forecast ability, i.e., his ability to earn higher 
returns than the ones predicted for a certain level of risk through the successful 
prediction of futures securities price movements. It is not to be mistaken with 
performance in terms of efficiency as in Markowitz (1952). He argued that in 
addition to knowing whether portfolio I performs better than portfolio II it would 
be important to understand how these portfolios do compared to an absolute 
standard. 
Now let us examine the intuition behind Jensen's Alpha. The CAPM implies 
that the expected return of an asset is equal to the riskless rate and a risk premium 
times the beta or systematic risk of that given asset. This is true for all unmanaged 
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portfolios. However, given the manager's forecasting abilities he will earn 
returns that will be systematically superior to the portfolio's risk level, which is 
not a possibility in CAPM. Fortunately, we can allow the estimation regression 
not to pass through the origin and incorporate manager's skill in the model by 
introducing an intercept – alpha (). Hence, if indeed the manager possesses the 
skill to positively predict future securities' prices, alpha () will be positive. If he 
does not, alpha () will be negative. 
3. The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) has been the cornerstone of asset 
pricing models and the foundation on which more recent models build. It was 
created by William Sharpe (Sharpe, 1964) and John Lintner (Lintner, 1965) and it 
compares the return of an asset in excess of a riskless rate to its beta coefficient. 
This coefficient can be interpreted as a measure of the sensitivity of the asset’s 
return to variation in the returns of the market. It derives from the division of the 
covariance between the asset and the market’s returns by the variance of the 
latter or, as Fama and French (Fama & French, 2004) so simply put it, the beta 
coefficient is proportional to the risk each dollar invested in asset I contributes to 
the market portfolio.  
The logic of the CAPM is that the return of a given asset equals the return of a 
riskless asset plus its beta coefficient times the market risk premium (given by 




4. Fama and French’s Three-Factor Model 
Even though the CAPM is, as mentioned above, still used in some practical 
cases, e.g., to estimate the cost of capital of a firm, there have been plenty studies 
highlighting its empirical contradictions as pointed out by Fama and French 
(1992). One of them, and possibly the most relevant is the size effect of Banz 
(1981). He provides evidence that suggest smaller firms have higher risk-
adjusted returns than larger firms. Although he does not attribute the size effect 
to the size of the firm per se, i.e., its market equity, he states that most likely the 
case is that size proxies for unknown factors and variables in some way related 
to it. Nonetheless, an indication of CAPM's misspecification.  
Later, Bhandari (1988) provides a compelling case that leverage is a natural 
proxy for the risk of common equity of a firm. His results are mirrored in the 
regression results that include the debt-to-equity ratio of a firm as an 
independent variable showing that there is in fact a positive relation between 
leverage and common stock returns. 
 Other factors that could potentially explain returns have been substantially 
reviewed and intensively studied such as the ratio of a firm's book value of equity 
to its market value (BE/ME) and the earnings-price ratio. Rosenberg, Reid and 
Lanstein (1985) and Chan, Hamao and Lakanishok (1991) study the relation 
between stock returns, book-to-market ratio and size and find significant 
relationship between them. These results led to the confirmation of a size effect. 
However, Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok (1991) underline the firms’ book-to-
market ratios’ performance both statistically and economically. 
 Basu (1983) examined the relation between earnings yield and returns. He 
confirms the existence of a positive effect of the E/P ratio in explaining returns 
and that effect is significant. High E/P firms, he states, outperform low E/P firms. 
However, Basu and Ball (1978) both argue that most likely this variable is a catch-
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all proxy (Fama & French, 1992) for determinants that are more fundamentally 
related to expected returns on common stock.  
Lastly, Fama and French argue that Ball's proxy argument for E/P can be 
extended to size, leverage and book-to-market equity and that they are 
transformations of stock prices or scaled stock prices and for that reason it may 
come as no surprise they are redundant for describing expected returns if used 
jointly. In other words, they are different ways of extracting information about 
stock prices.  
They state that on the condition assets are priced rationally, their results 
suggest that stock risks are multidimensional and one of those dimensions are 
proxied by size (ME) and the other by BE/ME. Fama and French (1993) document 
that both these variables are related to economic fundamentals. Firms that have 
a low BE/ME (meaning that investors anticipate healthy future profits and are 
willing to pay a premium for that) have high earnings and firms who have high 
BE/ME usually have low earnings. Also, size is considered to be related with 
profitability. Larger firms tend to have higher earnings than smaller firms. 
Hence, Fama and French build their model with three independent variables: 
the market, SMB (small minus big) and HML (high minus low). The market 
represents their proxy for the market factor measured as the excess market 
return. SMB (small minus big) is the difference between the returns on small 
stocks and big stocks. It is meant to mimic the risk factors related to size. Finally, 
HML (high minus low) is the difference between the returns on high BE/ME 
stocks and low BE/ME. This is meant to mimic the risk factors that relate to 
BE/ME. Their main result is that size and book-to-market equity capture the 
variation in average returns associated with size, earnings yield, book-to-market 
equity and leverage. 
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5. Carhart’s Four-Factor Model 
A very popular and very well documented debate is the one between 
contrarian and relative strength strategies. The contrarian strategy is based on 
the idea that agents generally tend to overreact to information. De Bondt and 
Thaler (1987) advocate that past losers outperform winners because of this 
phenomenon. The rationale is that stock price will either be overvalued or 
undervalued due to uninformed supply and demand and in the future will 
reverse making prior losers better investments than prior winners. However, 
Chan (1988) argues their results can be explained by systematic risk and the size 
effect.  
Evidence of persistence in performance of mutual funds has been found by 
studies that follow a relative strength strategy. The strategy builds on the idea 
that past performers will be future performers. Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser 
(1993) assess the mutual funds’ performance predictability over short periods of 
time and finds persistence of abnormal returns over the one-year horizon. He 
attributes the effect to “hot hands”, referring to the notion that a string of 
successes is followed by more success. Titman and Jegadeesh (1993) also employ 
a strategy that buys past winners and sells past losers. They find it generates 
positive returns over a 3 to 12 month holding period – a phenomenon they call 
momentum – and that the returns in questions do not derive from exposure to 
systematic risk. Other than common factors in stock returns, Grinblatt and 
Titman (1992) find persistence over longer horizons of five to ten years that they 
attribute to the manager’s ability to pick winning stocks. It seems, however, that 
performance persistence in mutual funds is dependent of the time period studied 
as documented by Brown and Goetzmann (1995).  
Contrary to Grinblatt and Titman (1992), Carhart (1997a) argues that 
persistence in performance does not mirror the manager’s stock-picking ability. 
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Rather, he argues that common stock factors, expenses and transactions cost 
explain mutual funds’ predictability. He also deconstructs the “hot hands” effect 
and finds that funds that follow momentum strategies and do realize abnormal 
returns do so not because of the fundamentals of the strategy but because they 
hold large positions in last year’s winning stocks. In order to measure 
performance Carhart (1997a) employs Fama and French’s 3-factor model (1992) 
and his own model that includes an additional factor that captures Titman and 
Jegadeesh’ (1993) momentum – PR1YR. 
6. Fama and French’s Five-Factor Model 
Following Carhart’s model studies reported the failure of Fama and French’s 
three-factor model to account for a number of asset pricing anomalies (Hou, Xue, 
& Zhang, 2015) and capture a large portion of the variation between average 
returns, profitability and investment (Novy-Marx, 2013). In response, Fama and 
French (2015) decide to analyse the relevance of the profitability and investment 
factors in explaining average returns. They explain the relation between these 
variables and average returns using the dividend discount model. The model 
says that the price of a stock equals the present value of its future dividends.   
The challenge then was to find some variable that could effectively proxy for 
profitability and investment. Novy-Marx (2013) finds that profitable firms earn 
significantly higher returns than unprofitable firms and suggests that gross 
profit-to-assets is the purest way to measure profit. He argues that it is highly 
related to stock returns comparing its explanatory power to the book-to-market 
ratio factor of Fama and French (1992). Aharoni (2013) present a statistically 
significant relation between investment and average returns building on the idea 
that aggressive investment firms earn higher abnormal returns than conservative 
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firms.. Hence, Fama and French (2015) add the profitability and investment factor 
to their three-factor model. The Fama and French five-factor model comprises of 
the market factor, SMB (small minus big), HML (high minus low), RMW (robust 
minus weak) – that captures the difference between returns of stocks with robust 
and weak profitability – and CMA (conservative minus aggressive) – that 
captures the difference between returns of low and high investment firms. 
7. Founder-CEO firm’s performance  
The relevance of founder-CEO firms’ studies is indisputable. 11% of the largest 
public U.S. firms are led by founder-CEOS (Fahlenbrach, 2009) and 60% of GDP 
is generated by family controlled private businesses (McConaughy, Matthews, & 
Fialko, 2001). While this study focuses on publicly traded companies, the 
characteristics that drive performance in founder-CEO firms can be assumed to 
exist in private firms. This is a good indicator of the importance of the matter. 
What also motivates this study is the concept that founder-CEO firms will 
have better performance than firms in which the CEO is not a founder due to 
reduction of agency costs. The agency theory postulates that significant costs will 
arise from the misalignment of shareholders and managers interests 
(McConaughy et al., 2001) and from monitoring costs related to firm size and 
ownership structure. If the firm's CEO is a founder it is reasonable to assume, 
however, that his interests are perfectly aligned with those of shareholders. 
Whether it is because he considers the firm to be his life achievement, he values 
their reputational stake or because of his equity stake (having a substantial 
amount of their fortune in the firm can lead to diligent and cautious behaviour) 
(Jayaraman, Khorana, Nelling, & Covin, 2000). In addition, one can argue that 
the costs related to firm size can be eliminated by increased managerial control. 
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Still, answers remains to be found as various authors arrive to ambiguous and 
dissimilar results. Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira (2009) find a causal relation 
between founder-CEO and firm performance concerning market valuation and 
operating performance. Fahlenbrach (2009) reports that an equal weighted 
portfolio composed by founder-CEO firms would have earned a return of 8.3% 
during 1993-2002. On the other hand, Jayaraman et al. (2000) found no significant 
relation and Fama (1980) suggests that the separation of ownership and control 
is an efficient form of economic organization. 
Finally, most of the studies conducted look for a relation between founder-
CEO firms and performance use Tobin's Q and ROA (return on assets) to 
measure the latter and use instrumental variables methods to disentangle the 
effect of founder-CEOs on performance from the effect of performance on 

















Chapter 2  
Theoretical Hypothesis and Econometric Model 
1. Theoretical Hypothesis 
 
Agency costs are of the utmost importance in the corporate world. These are 
internal costs that represent misaligning interests between shareholders and the 
management team, specifically, the CEO. The fundamental point is that these 
costs arise from the separation of ownership and control. While shareholders 
want to maximize their value, the managers might sometimes take actions that 
benefit themselves rather than the shareholders. In addition to considering their 
firms as their life’s achievement and having a different attitude towards risk 
(Fahlenbrach, 2009), the founder-CEO has a very considerable amount of equity 
of his firm. Thus, actions that may be taken to benefit himself are also benefiting 
shareholders, reducing agency costs and therefore increasing the firm’s value.  
 
Hypothesis: the presence of a founder-CEO positively relates to the creation 






2. Econometric Method 
 
In order to find the answer to my research question I will use the performance 
evaluation models covered before in the literature review. Specifically, the three-
factor model by Fama and French (1992), the four-factor model by Carhart 
(1997a) and the five-factor model by Fama and French (2015). 
Founder-CEO firms is the criterion by which I will form two stock portfolios: 




𝑉𝑋𝑆𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 =  𝑉𝑊𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝛼1𝑡 + 𝑏𝑡(𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡) +  𝑠1𝑡𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ1𝑡𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀1𝑡             (1) 
𝑉𝑋𝑆𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 =  𝑉𝑊𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝛼2𝑡 + 𝑏2𝑡(𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡) +  𝑠2𝑡𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ2𝑡𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑤2𝑡𝑊𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀2𝑡       (2) 
𝑉𝑋𝑆𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 =  𝑉𝑊𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝛼3𝑡 + 𝑏3𝑡(𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡) +  𝑠3𝑡𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ3𝑡𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑟3𝑡𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 +
𝑐3𝑡𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜀3𝑡                                                                                                                                             (3)        
      
       
Equal-weighted Portfolio: 
      
𝐸𝑋𝑆𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 =  𝐸𝑊𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝛼4𝑡 + 𝑏4𝑡(𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡) +  𝑠4𝑡𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ4𝑡𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀4𝑡          (4) 
𝐸𝑋𝑆𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 =  𝐸𝑊𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝛼5𝑡 + 𝑏5𝑡(𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡) +  𝑠5𝑡𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ5𝑡𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑤5𝑡𝑊𝑀𝐿 + 𝜀5𝑡       (5) 
𝐸𝑋𝑆𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 =  𝐸𝑊𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝛼6𝑡 + 𝑏6𝑡(𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡) +  𝑠6𝑡𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ6𝑡𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑟6𝑡𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 +
𝑐6𝑡𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜀6𝑡                                                                                                                                               (6) 
 
 
where 𝐸𝑋𝑆𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡  and 𝑉𝑋𝑆𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡  are the excess returns of the equal-weighted and 
value-weighted portfolios for period t given by 𝐸𝑊𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 and 𝑉𝑊𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 deducted of 
the risk-free rate, respectively. 𝑉𝑊𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡  is the value-weighted return on the 
portfolio for period 𝑡, 𝐸𝑊𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 is the equal-weighted return on the portfolio for 
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period 𝑡, 𝑅𝐹𝑡  is the risk-free return for period 𝑡, 𝑅𝑀𝑡  is the return on a value-
weighted market portfolio for period 𝑡, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 is the difference in returns between 
a portfolio of small stocks and portfolio of big stocks for period 𝑡, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 is the 
difference in returns between a portfolio of high and low BE/ME stocks for period 
𝑡, 𝑊𝑀𝐿𝑡 is the return on portfolios of one-year momentum stocks for period 𝑡, 
𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡  is the difference in returns between a portfolio of robust and weak 
profitability for period, 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 is the difference in returns between a portfolio of 
stocks of conservative and aggressive firms for period 𝑡 and 𝜀𝑡 is the error term 
for period t. 
  I will employ the same econometric estimator proposed by Fama and 
French (1992) to obtain estimates of the models’ coefficients – the OLS (Ordinary 
Least Squares) estimator. Finally, if the dependent variables used are indeed 
capturing the risk that investors are exposed to and therefore the return they 
demand the intercept should be equal to zero. Thus, in order to answer my 
research question, I will test if the intercept is different from zero. Meaning that 
there is some other factor that is not being accounted for in the regression 
equations. 
The time-series nature of the data can cause a variety of issues in what regards 
the OLS regression estimator’s assumptions, specifically error heteroskedasticity, 
i.e., when the variance of the error is different between observations or groups of 
observations, and correlation between the errors of different observations. The 
latter is particularly important because it will be present on any time-series study 
of stock performance assuming that today’s return will impact tomorrow’s and 
thereafter. Nonetheless, using the Newey-West estimator will allow to 
circumvent the assumptions mentioned, i.e., it will correct the variance formula 
by obtaining correct coefficient estimates’ variances that allow to test for their 






Chapter 3  
Data description 
In this chapter I will explain the data retrieval and manipulation process 
characterizing the sample and the dependent and independent variables 
constructed to conduct this study. 
1. Sample description 
One of the greatest challenges the conduction of this study posed was the time-
consuming process of finding firms in which the CEO was also founder. Given 
this, I decided to use a different approach. Instead of looking up CEO-founder 
firms one by one, I have decided that my sample would be composed of the firms 
present in The Global X Founder-Run Companies ETF.  This exchange-traded 
fund is traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), has $4 million under 
management and is composed of 96 US companies 2  that have one specific 
characteristic in common: they are co-founder or founder led.   
It is important to note that the fund mentioned above is an active fund. 
Meaning that it has positions in active firms. This creates a selection bias issue in 
the form of survivorship bias. Presently dead firms that were founder-run were 
not included in the sample. One can then forecast the existence of a percentage 
 
2 Companies are listed on Appendix 1. 
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of abnormal returns on the portfolios that can be explained by successful business 
models or good quality management of the firms involved but not necessarily for 
being run by founders. 
Then, using the Thomson Reuters Eikon Datastream database, I downloaded 
monthly prices of each firms’ stock  for the period between 2010 and 2019 using 
the variable RI (Total Return Index) and the market capitalization values for each 
of the firms that constitute the above-mentioned fund which were then used to 
construct the dependent variables, as I will explain below. 
The independent variables were extracted from Professor Kenneth R. French’s 
data library at Tuck School of Business of Dartmouth College. The data is time-
series and comprises of monthly information also for the period between 2010 to 
2019 totalling 120 months.  
2. Variables 
2.1 Dependent Variable 
  
The equal-weighted portfolio returns were initially constructed by calculating 
the individual stock returns and averaging them by the number of firms. The 
value-weighted portfolio returns were constructed using the same method with 
the difference, however, that they were weighted by their respective market 
capitalization. Finally, these returns were deducted of the risk-free rate to 
calculate both dependent variables, the excess returns, measured in percentage 





2.2 Independent Variables 
 
As already mentioned, the independent variables were obtained from 
Professor’s Kenneth French website. These were used in the estimation 
regressions with the goal of providing faithful estimates of the intercept and thus 
presenting an answer to this study. The rationale is that these variables, that are 
based on firms’ characteristics, proxy for exposure to systematic risk that must 
be remunerated. 
 
i. Market risk premium (RM-RF): 
 
The market risk premium was the sole predictor in Sharpe’s CAPM (Sharpe, 
1964) of efficient market portfolios and it is the slope on the security market line 
(SML). The efficiency ensured that expected returns on securities are a positive 
function of their market s (Fama & French, 1992). It provides a quantitative 
measure of the return demanded by investor for exposure to market risk and is 
calculated by deducting the return of a market portfolio of the risk-free rate, in 
this case given by U.S. Treasury bond yields. 
 
ii. Small minus Big (SMB): 
 
Banz (1981) finds that the firms’ market equity (ME) adds to the explanation 
of average returns and that these returns are too high on small (low ME) stocks 
and to low on big (high ME) stocks. The SMB variable is therefore computed as 
the difference in returns on a portfolio of small (low ME) stocks and a portfolio 
of big stocks (high ME). 
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iii. High minus Low (HML): 
 
High minus Low concerns the book-to-market equity ratio (BE/ME) of a firm. 
Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok (1991) find positive evidence on Japanese stocks 
that supports Rosenberg, Reid and Lanstein’s (1985)’s findings that average 
returns are positively related to a firms’ BE/ME. Thus, Fama and French (1992) 
add this variable to their three-factor model. 
 
iv. Winners minus Losers (WML): 
 
Initially proposed by Titman and Jegadeesh (1993) and applied by Carhart 
(1997) this variable captures excess returns that are contributed by stocks’ 
momentum, i.e., the tendency for stocks that are performing well to continue 
performing. 
 
v. Robust minus Weak (RMW): 
   
The variable in question represents the returns of firms with robust 
profitability in excess of weak profitability firms as proposed by Fama and 
French (2015). It captures investors’ return demand for exposure to this specific 
firm characteristic. 
 
vi. Conservative minus Aggressive (CMA): 
 
The CMA variable, along with RMW, was proposed by Fama and French 
(2015) to remunerate exposure to firms’ investment policies. It represents the 
 37 
spread between a portfolio of conservative investment firms and one of 
aggressive investment firms. 
3. Summary Statistics     
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the data in the sample. This study 
involved 96 firms’ information throughout 120 months. The average number of 
firms per month is 74 e and the average number of months per firm is 99. The 
average market capitalization for the firms involved is $19 641 772. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for all the variables used: dependent 
variables and independent variables. The summary statistics table below 
suggests that, in the median month, the equal-weight portfolio has obtained an 
excess return of 2.59% and the value-weighted portfolio has obtained a 2.74% 
excess return. In this month, the market risk premium equals 1.15%, the size 
premium equals 0.43%, the value premium equals 0.19%, the momentum 
premium equals 0.78% and the profitability and investment premium equal to 








Avg. nr. of 
firms per 
period 
Avg. nr. of 
months per 
firm 
Avg. mkt. cap. 
per period 
     
96 120 74 99 19 641 772 
1. The statistics presented are computed across 120 observations. 
2. The average market capitalization per period is shown in USD. 
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
            
EXSRet 0.0209 0.0259 -0.1828 0.1341 0.0486 
VXSRet 0.0210 0.0274 -0.1831 0.1484 0.0525 
RM-RF 0.0105 0.0115 -0.0952 0.1156 0.0376 
SMB 0.0008 0.0043 -0.0492 0.0529 0.0202 
HML -0.0017 0.0019 -0.0577 0.0678 0.0228 
WML 0.0049 0.0078 -0.0685 0.0750 0.0274 
RMW 0.0032 0.0044 -0.0363 0.0302 0.0134 
CMA 0.0022 0.0045 -0.0348 0.0329 0.0144 






















Estimation Results and Discussion 
I will start by presenting a correlation matrix of the variables used to test for 
multicollinearity among the explanatory variables and proceed to demonstrate 
the estimation results of the three-factor, four-factor and five-factor models 
(described in Chapter 3) obtained for both the value-weighted portfolio and the 
equal-weighted portfolio. In what follows I will describe their global as well as 
individual significance and adequacy to answer the research matter in hand. 
1. Multicollinearity 
The assumption of no perfect multicollinearity is one of the cornerstones of the 
OLS estimator and as such should be accounted for. Multicollinearity occurs 
when the independent variables in a regression are perfectly or almost perfectly 
colinear with each other. In other words, no variable can be expressed as a linear 
combination of the other.  The correlation matrix presented in Table 3 was used 






Table 3: Correlation matrix 
Variables MktRF SMB HML RMW CMA WML        
MktRF 1.000 
     
SMB 0.3955 1.000 
    
HML 0.0147 0.1862 1.000 
   
RMW -0.2854 -0.4449 -0.1965 1.000 
  
CMA -0.0894 0.0913 0.6991 -0.0563 1.000 
 
WML -0.1512 -0.1089 -0.4108 0.1156 -0.2333 1.000 
 
Table 3 presents the correlation values between independent variables. Except 
for a correlation of 0.6991 between the CMA and HML’s variables, the absence of 
highly positive or negative correlations in the above results suggests that there is 
no presence of multicollinearity. 
2. Estimation Results 
The results of the three, four and five factor models are presented below for 












2.1 Value-weighted portfolio 
 
Table 4 presents the estimation results for the value-weighted portfolio. In 
equation (1), the three-factor model, I estimated a positive intercept of 1.58%, a 
market risk premium of 41.73%, a size premium of 22.69% and a value premium 
of -37.13%. The results suggest that all coefficients are significantly different from 
zero at the 1% level except for the SMB factor.  
 
Table 4: Value-weighted portfolio regressions’ results. 
Coefficients\Equation   (1)   (2)   (3) 
              
   0.0158***   0.0171***   0.0201*** 
    (0.0030)   (0.0032)   (0.0036) 
RM-RF   0.4173***   0.2372***   0.3420*** 
    (0,1143)   (0.1167)   (0.1169) 
SMB   0.2269   -0.4973   0.0833 
    (0.2118)   (0.211)   (0.2023) 
HML   -0.3713***   -0.2535**   0.1172 
    (0.1513)   (0.14603)   (0.2957) 
WML       -0.3514***     
        (0.1463)     
RMW           -0.5909* 
            (0.3156) 
CMA           -1.2035* 
            (0.4848) 
              
Overall F-test   6.8400**   13.6100***   8.7500*** 
Adjusted R-squared  0.2627  0.2952  0.3142 
1.All specifications include a constant term and are based on 120 observations;    
2. Newey-west standard errors in brackets;             
3. *** denotes p-values inferior to 1%; ** denotes p-values inferior to 5% and * denotes p-values 
inferior to 10%.  
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In equation (2), the four-factor model, I estimated a positive intercept of 1.71%, 
a market risk premium of 23.72%, a size premium of -49.73%, a value premium 
of -25.35% and a momentum premium of -35.14%. These results are similar to the 
ones in equation (1). In equation (3), the five-factor model, I estimated a positive 
intercept of 2.01%, a market risk premium of 34.20%, a size premium of 8.33%, a 
value premium of 11.72%, a profitability premium of -59.09% and an investment 
premium of -120.35%. The results obtained by this model are quite different from 
the other two in what magnitude, direction and significance are concerned. In the 
five-factor model, the first two coefficients are significantly different from zero at 
the 1% level, unlike the following two, the SMB and HML’s coefficient estimates, 
that present no statistical significance at all, and the last two, the RMW and 
CMA’s coefficient estimates, that are significant at the 10% level only. 
Furthermore, the analysis shows the models above are well specified meaning 
that they were correctly constructed by observation of the global significance test.  
The remaining results are fascinating. It is clear to see that in all models the 
intercepts are statistically significant from zero at the 1% level and with estimates 
of tremendous magnitude coming at 1.58%, 1.71% and 2.01%, respectively. This 
means that an unmanaged value-weighted portfolio of founder-CEO firms 









2.2 Equal-weighted portfolio 
 
Table 5 presents the estimation results for the equal-weighted portfolio. In 
equation (4), the three-factor model, I estimated a positive intercept of 1.51%, a 
market risk premium of 44.59%, a size premium of 68.60% and a value premium 
of -35.79%. In equation (5), the four-factor model, I estimated an intercept of 
1.70%, a market risk premium of 40.57%, a size premium of 70.04%, a value 
premium of -53.25% and a momentum premium of -35.14%. 
 
Table 5: Equal-weighted portfolio regressions’ results. 
Coefficients\Estimates   (4)   (5)   (6) 
              
   0.0151***   0.0170***   0.0201*** 
    (0.0025)   (0,0027)   (0.0027) 
RM-RF   0.4459***   0.4057***   0.3839*** 
    (0.1299)   (0.1182)   (0.1265) 
SMB   0.6860***   0.7004***   0.5147*** 
    (0.18467)   (0.1825)   (0.1762) 
HML   -0.3579***   -0.5325***   -0.0960*** 
    (0.1222)   (0.1342)   (0.2205) 
WML       -0.3514***     
        (0.1179)     
RMW           -0.7042*** 
            (0.2368) 
CMA           -0.7105*** 
            (0.3578) 
              
Overall F-test   13.0000***   24.4200***   12.2600*** 
Adjusted R-squared  0.1146  0.1215  0.1801 
1.All specifications include a constant term and are based on 120 observations;    
2.Newey-west standard errors in brackets;             
3. *** denotes p-values inferior to 1%; ** denotes p-values inferior to 5% and * denotes p-values 
inferior to 10%.  
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A comparison of the fourth and fifth equation shows no major differences. In 
equation (6), the five-factor model, I estimated an intercept of 2.01%, a market 
risk premium of 38.39%, a size premium of 8.33%, a value premium of 11.72%, a 
profitability premium of -70.42% and an investment premium of -71.05%. There 
is once more a very satisfying positive global significance test at the 1% level. 
There is 1% level statistical significance across all variables and models.  
The intercepts’ estimates are in general of the same magnitude with the 
exception of the four-factor model’s estimate which slightly decreases to an 
excess return of 1.70%. 


















Conclusions and Limitations 
In a fast-moving economy in which entrepreneurship plays an important role, 
founder-CEO firms’ performance is a topic that certainly deserves more attention 
in academic literature. The existing studies suggest that there are key differences 
in the various aspects of managerial strategies and directions that lead to 
improved efficiency and performance. As already mentioned, this study will 
address the performance problem from a stock market performance standpoint 
as opposed to most studies that take an approach based on Tobin’s Q and ROA 
(return on assets). 
The first step into understanding how to effectively measure was to conduct a 
comprehensive and exhaustive literature review on a variety of topics ranging 
from traditional measures of performance to more recent and complex asset 
pricing models. Three models were chosen: the three-factor model by Fama and 
French (1992); the four-factor model by Carhart (1997) and the more recent five-
factor model by Fama and French (2015). These models where then used to 
regress independent variables that proxy for firm characteristics on excess 
returns on equal and value-weighted portfolios formed using 96 firms that are 
either founder or co-founder led. Before moving to the conclusions withdrawn 
from the results obtained it is important to review the intuition behind these 
models. They are empirical models that were created in a search for firm’s 
characteristics that could proxy for underlying features and measures of 
performance as determinants of excess returns obtained. As such, in a well 
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specified model, the intercept will not be, in a statistical sense, significantly 
different from zero. Meaning that those returns were completely explained by 
the proxies in question. While important in understanding the predictive power 
of the models, the focus of this study is not to interpret or in any way establish 
relations between independent and the dependent variables. Instead, it looks for 
intercepts that are significantly different from zero as a measure of the creation 
or destruction of the company’s value. 
The results obtained by following the above-mentioned process are exciting 
and very clear. Both value-weighted and equal-weighted regressions are robust, 
well specified and globally significant at the 1% level. In both models the 
intercepts are different from zero at the 1% level with coefficient estimates 
ranging from 1.51% to 2.01%. This implies that a very significant percentage of 
the monthly excess returns obtained by these founder-CEO firms are explained 
by something other than the size and value premium or the momentum and 
profitability factor. In accordance with Fahlenbrach (2009) these results provide 
suggestive evidence that some characteristics of the firms used to compose the 
portfolios allows them to create additional value. I firmly believe that the 
additional value originates mainly in the reduction of agency costs but also in the 
augmented skills and strategy of founder ownership and managerial control. 
There are however some limitations that may have restrained or that could 
possibly have led to different results. The first concerns the limited number of 
firms in the sample. Finding firms that are founder-run is an exhaustive 
procedure and poses a great challenge for further research. One can speculate 
that results can be different or in some way more valid if a larger sample were 
used.  
Secondly, other reasons for the obtainment of positive excess returns were left 
out of scope. It is reasonable to wonder to what extent are these stock returns 
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related to growth strategies and solid business models and not founder-CEO 
managerial skills.  
The third limitation is the presence of survivorship bias. Given that my sample 
is composed of the holdings of an active exchange-traded fund it obviously 
excludes dead firms that were founder-led from the analysis which could have 
led to upwards biased results.  
Finally, the last limitation has to do with transaction costs. The analysis 
conducted does not consider transaction costs that arise from transactions, i.e., 
buying and selling stocks, that are needed to adjust portfolio weights according 
to market capitalization moves. This is not the case for the value-weighted 
portfolio since it adjusts itself automatically, but it is particularly relevant for the 
equal-weighted portfolio given the need for constant balance readjustments. 
Either way, further research on the topic should allow us to answer these 
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Appendix 1: Firms in the sample. 
Firm Ticker 
INTERCONTINENTAL  U:ICE 
TESLA INC  @TSLA 
ROKU INC  @ROKU 
RINGCENTRAL INC  U:RNG 
SP INC  U:SP 
PAYCOM SOFTWARE INC  U:PAYC 
SEATTLE GENETICS  @SGEN 
COSTAR GROUP CO  CN:LOE 
NVIDIA CORPORATION  @NVDA 
MEDICAL PROPERTIES  U:MPW 
MARKETAXESS HLDGS  @MKTX 
KKR & CO INC  D:KR5X 
MASIMO CORPORATION  @MASI 
ALTERYX INC  U:AYX 
EPAM SYSTE  U:EPAM 
NEUROCRINE  @NBIX 
PENUMBRA  U:PEN 
TRADE DESK INC  @TTD 
FORTINET INC  @FTNT 
OKTA INC  @OKTA 
SEI INVESTMENTS  @SEIC 
SKECHERS U.S.A., INC  U:SKX 
AKAMAI TECHNOLOGIES  @AKAM 
STARWOOD PROPERTY  U:STWD 
HEALTHCARE TRUST OF  U:HTA 
PEGASYSTEMS INC  @PEGA 
AMERICAN HOM  U:AMH 
CAMDEN PROPERTY  U:CPT 
STAG INDUSTRIAL  U:STAG 
GUARDANT HEALTH INC  @GH 
BLACKROCK INC  U:BLK 
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MONOLITHIC POWER SYS  @MPWR 
ALPHABET INC  @GOOGL 
CLEAN HARBORS, INC.  U:CLH 
SALESFORCE.COM, INC.  U:CRM 
JAZZ PHA  @JAZZ 
ZAYO GROUP  U:ZAYO 
SIGTURE BANK  @SBNY 
CAPITAL ONE FIN'L  U:COF 
ESSENT GROUP  U:ESNT 
UNIVERSAL HEALTH SVC  U:UHS 
EURONET WORLDWIDE  @EEFT 
DISH NETWORK  @DISH 
FACEBOOK INC  @FB 
VEEVA SYSTEMS INC  U:VEEV 
VERISIGN, INC.  @VRSN 
TEXAS ROADHOUSE, INC  @TXRH 
SQUARE  U:SQ 
NEXSTAR MEDIA GROUP  @NXST 
BRANDYWINE REALTY  U:BDN 
AVALARA INC  U:AVLR 
HUBSPOT INC  U:HUBS 
ZENDESK INC  U:ZEN 
LAS VEGAS SANDS CORP  U:LVS 
AMAZON.COM INC  @AMZN 
UBIQUITI INC  U:UI 
VORDO REALTY TRUST  U:VNO 
REGENERON PHARMA  @REGN 
AMERICAN CAMPUS COMM  U:ACC 
ATHENE HOLDING LTD  U:ATH 
STEEL DYMICS, INC.  @STLD 
SS&C TECHNOLOGIES  @SSNC 
UNITED THERAPEUTICS  @UTHR 
L BRANDS INC  U:LB 
NETFLIX INC  @NFLX 
TWILIO INC  U:TWLO 
CARGURUS INC  @CARG 
REALPAGE INC  @RP 
 54 
WORKDAY  @WDAY 
UNDER ARMOUR, INC.  U:UAA 
URBAN OUTFITTERS  @URBN 
TWITTER INC  U:TWTR 
WINTRUST FINCIAL  @WTFC 
ZSCALER  @ZS 
LYFT INC  @LYFT 
GRUBHUB  U:GRUB 
FEDEX CORP  U:FDX 
LENDINGTREE INC  @TREE 
IONIS PHARMACEUT  @IONS 
ULTRAGENYX  @RARE 
PEBBLEBROOK  U:PEB 
NUTANIX INC  @NTNX 
TIOL BEVERAGE  @FIZZ 
DELL TECH  U:DELL 
ALLOGENE THERAPE  @ALLO 
IPG PHOTONICS CORP  @IPGP 
INSPERITY INC  U:NSP 
VIASAT, INC.  @VSAT 
DROPBOX  @DBX 
NEW RELIC  U:NEWR 
WAYFAIR INC  U:W 
WORLD WRESTLING ENT  U:WWE 
TRIPADVISO  @TRIP 
OLLIE'S BARGAIN  @OLLI 
GREEN DOT CORP  U:GDOT 
2U INC  @TWOU 
 
 
